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INTRODUCTION 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights1 (TRIPs Agreement) was established at the ministerial meeting 
in Marrakesh in April 1994.  Since its establishment, many less 
developed countries have been dissatisfied with the international 
intellectual property system.  From their perspective, the system fails to 
take into consideration their needs, interests, and local conditions.  The 
strong protection mandated under the TRIPs Agreement also threatens 
their much-needed access to information, knowledge, and essential 
medicines. 
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the TRIPs Agreement.  It 
provides an excellent opportunity to assess the Agreement’s 
achievements and shortfalls, in particular its impact on the international 
community as well as on other areas not related to intellectual property, 
such as agriculture, health, environment, education, and culture.  As we 
move into the second decade of this Agreement, it is also appropriate to 
explore how we can preserve the goals and intentions behind the TRIPs 
negotiations and to look ahead at the future challenges confronting the 
international intellectual property system. 
This Article traces the development of the TRIPs Agreement and 
explores what less developed countries need to do to preserve the goals 
and intentions behind the TRIPs negotiations.  Part I describes the four 
different narratives used to explain the origins of the Agreement.  This 
Part contends that while none of these narratives is complete, each 
provides valuable insight into understanding the context in which the 
Agreement was created.  Part II focuses on the TRIPs Agreement and 
explores why less developed countries have been dissatisfied with the 
international intellectual property system.  This Part also discusses the 
latest developments in the area, such as the recent World Trade 
Organization (WTO) debacle in Cancún, the proliferation of bilateral 
and plurilateral free trade agreements, and the increasing use of 
technological protection measures.  Part III offers suggestions on how 
less developed countries can reform the international intellectual 
property system.  This Article does not call for a complete overhaul or 
the abandonment of the TRIPs Agreement.  Instead, it takes the 
 
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
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position that the Agreement is here to stay and explores, from that 
standpoint, how less developed countries can take advantage of the 
Agreement and reform the international intellectual property system. 
I.  THE PAST 
A.  The Bargain Narrative 
Four dominant narratives have accounted for the origins of the 
TRIPs Agreement.  The most widely accepted narrative is the bargain 
narrative,2 in which the Agreement was considered the product of a 
compromise between developed and less developed countries.  While 
developed countries received stronger protection for intellectual 
property rights and a reduction in restrictions against foreign direct 
investment, less developed countries obtained, in return, lower tariffs on 
textiles and agriculture and protection via the mandatory dispute 
settlement process against unilateral sanctions imposed by the United 
States and other developed countries. 
At the time of the negotiations, the bargaining power between 
developed and less developed countries was far from equal.  A case in 
point is the difference between the protection developed countries 
obtained through the TRIPs Agreement and the protection less 
developed countries obtained through the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing.  While developed countries have to “phase out” their quotas 
on the most sensitive items of textiles and clothing on the last day of the 
ten-year transitional period, less developed countries are required to 
“phase in” product patents for pharmaceuticals on the first day of the 
identical transitional period.3  In addition, although the TRIPs 
Agreement required less developed countries to strengthen intellectual 
property protection, it guaranteed the prospects of neither technical 
assistance from developed countries nor increased foreign investment.  
As one commentator noted, “[T]o pass and enforce the laws that create 
the US$60 billion a year obligation is a bound obligation; however, the 
implementation assistance and the impact on investment and innovation 
 
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:  GLOBAL COMPETITION 
AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12 (1998); Frederick M. Abbott, The 
WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND 
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 39 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 
1997). 
3. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2001). 
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are not.”4 
Notwithstanding the unequal bargaining power, each group of 
countries seemed to have been able to obtain what they considered to 
be in their self-interests.  Before the turn of this century, there was no 
doubt that agriculture and textile products were more important to less 
developed countries than intellectual property-related goods and 
services.  Even today, these trade items remain very important—so 
important that the disagreement over how to handle these items, or 
more precisely how to handle subsidies in the area, led to the 
breakdown of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún.5  Indeed, the 
recent Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong would have been another 
failure had the WTO member states been unable to agree on a deadline 
for ending subsidies for agricultural exports.6 
Moreover, less developed countries had been very concerned about 
unilateral trade sanctions since Congress introduced the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act in 1988.7  Aimed at bolstering the leverage of 
U.S. trade negotiations, that statute amended section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act and requires the United States Trade Representative to 
identify foreign countries that provide inadequate intellectual property 
protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or 
equitable market access.8 
By offering a mandatory dispute settlement process, the TRIPs 
Agreement shields less developed countries from threats of trade 
sanctions.  Indeed, many less developed countries claimed that it would 
have been pointless for them to join the WTO had the United States 
been able to continue imposing unilateral sanctions despite their 
membership.9  Fortunately, in United States—Sections 301–310 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, the WTO dispute settlement panel confirmed that a 
 
4. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE:  
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (J. Michael Finger 
& Philip Schuler eds., 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/Poor_Peoples_ 
Knowledge.pdf. 
5. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2003, at A1; Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24. 
6. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Officials Agree to End Subsidies for Agricultural Exports, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at C1. 
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2495 (2000). 
8. Id. § 2242(a)(1). 
9. See, e.g., David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights:  The 
Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 893, 909 (1989) (suggesting that states might 
not accept new multilateral commitments in the intellectual property area if they are going to 
be vulnerable to unilateral actions). 
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member state could only pursue unilateral sanctions after it had 
exhausted all actions permissible under the rules of the international 
trading body.10 
Although the bargain narrative is fairly convincing and widely 
accepted, commentators, most notably Susan Sell, have recently 
provided a counter-narrative challenging the role of the governments of 
the United States and the European Communities as stated in the 
narrative.11  As Professor Sell explained: 
State-centric accounts of the Uruguay Round are at best 
incomplete, and at worst misleading, as they obscure the driving 
forces behind the TRIPS Agreement. . . . In the TRIPS case, 
private actors pursued their interests through multiple channels 
and struck bargains with multiple actors:  domestic interindustry 
counterparts, domestic governments, foreign governments, 
foreign private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign 
industry associations, and international organizations.  They 
vigorously pursued their IP objectives at all possible levels and in 
multiple venues, successfully redefining intellectual property as a 
trade issue. . . . [I]t was not merely their relative economic power 
that led to their ultimate success, but their command of IP 
expertise, their ideas, their information, and their framing skills 
(translating complex issues into political discourse).12 
B.  The Coercion Narrative 
The second narrative is the coercion narrative.  This narrative is 
common among scholars who originate from, or who are sympathetic to, 
less developed countries.  In this narrative, the TRIPs Agreement is 
considered an unfair trade document that developed countries imposed 
on their less developed counterparts.  The Agreement is “coercive,” 
“imperialistic,” and does not take into consideration the goals and 
interests of less developed countries.13  As Jagdish Bhagwati noted:  
 
10. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report]. 
11. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW:  THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role 
of the WTO:  Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 830 (2003) 
[hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO] (observing that “successful 
rent-seeking transforms the state into an agent of a particular segment of society instead of a 
guardian of welfare for all”). 
12. SELL, supra note 11, at 8; see also Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, 
supra note 11, at 846 (noting that “the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement was a 
combination of sub-sets of coalitions of private industry and their respective states”). 
13. See sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving 
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“TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it positions the WTO 
primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf 
of multinational corporations.”14 
Consider, for example, geographical indications.  Article 23 of the 
TRIPs Agreement offers special protection to geographical indications 
for wines and spirits.15  However, it does not offer similar protection to 
Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea, which are important to less developed 
countries.16  Even worse for these countries, the protection granted 
under the Agreement focuses on individual creations—often with an 
identified author or inventor.  It, therefore, does not protect those 
outside the existing model, such as “custodians of tribal culture and 
medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical 
forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties.”17 
While the coercion narrative is thought-provoking, especially from 
the perspective of international development, it is far from complete.  
Although it is hard to deny that the stronger protection required by the 
TRIPs Agreement favors developed countries, it is also difficult to 
argue that the TRIPs Agreement is completely unfair to less developed 
countries.  Indeed, the bargain narrative has suggested otherwise.  As 
the TRIPs Agreement was created as a compromise between developed 
and less developed countries, developed countries received concessions 
in the intellectual property area while less developed countries received 
benefits elsewhere.  Thus, it is logical for the TRIPs Agreement to be 
one-sided in the intellectual property area.  Viewed from this 
 
Global Intellectual Property Disputes:  What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business 
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 580 (2002) 
[hereinafter Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach]. 
14. Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries into a New 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in DEP’T FOREIGN AFFS. & INT’L TRADE, TRADE 
POLICY RESEARCH 2001, at 19, 21 (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/pdf/ 
02-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2005). 
15. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 23. 
16. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 239 (2000) (noting that “the evolving language in TRIPS on geographical 
indications remains largely . . . confined to wines and spirits, while many developing countries 
point to food products that could be protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and 
Darjeeling tea”).  Obviously, it is much easier to settle on the protection of geographical 
indications used in wines and spirits than to develop comparable protection for Basmati rice 
and Darjeeling tea.  While the former has been widely accepted in Europe, questions remain 
as to whether the latter fits well in the geographical indications category.  Nevertheless, this 
example shows that the TRIPs Agreement covers issues more important to developed 
countries than to their less developed counterparts. 
17. The Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND 
SPLEENS:  LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192, 193 (1996). 
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perspective, the TRIPs Agreement is not biased because developed 
countries are unfair to less developed countries.  Rather, it is biased 
because those who find it biased focus solely on the Agreement while 
ignoring the context of the WTO bargaining process and the cross-
sectoral concessions less developed countries have gained in other areas. 
Moreover, as Ruth Okediji noted: 
Rationalizations that depict the TRIPS Agreement as another 
example of North-South power disparities tell a much too simple 
story.  Indeed, one of the noted triumphs of the Uruguay Round 
was the unprecedented level of developing country participation 
in the negotiations.  Within the specific context of the TRIPS 
negotiations, alliances that formed over a variety of subjects 
crossed the traditional North-South divisions.  These alliances 
also included industry groups whose positions on issues 
(ultimately of tremendous influence on official government 
positions) also had to be reconciled with competing intra-
industry priorities.18 
C.  The Ignorance Narrative 
The third narrative is the ignorance narrative.  In this narrative, less 
developed countries are portrayed as countries that did not understand 
the importance of intellectual property protection during the TRIPs 
negotiations.  Because of their ignorance, many less developed countries 
did not understand the consequence of the Agreement and how the 
required protection would impact their countries in such other areas as 
agriculture, health, environment, education, and culture. 
While the TRIPs Agreement no doubt has awoken many less 
developed countries, as well as nongovernmental organizations,19 it is 
factually incorrect to assume that less developed countries did not 
understand any importance of intellectual property protection.  Since 
the mid-1960s, less developed countries have been making demands for 
reforming the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (Berne Convention) and the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).20  During the 
revision of the Berne Convention at the Stockholm Revision 
 
18. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, supra note 11, at 839–40 
(footnote omitted). 
19. See SELL, supra note 11, at 181. 
20. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual 
Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and 
Crosscurrents]. 
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Conference, for example, less developed countries, led by India, 
demanded “that unless some major copyright concessions were made 
for developing countries, they would have to make drastic changes in 
their international copyright arrangements.”21  In addition, it was the 
breakdown of the 1981 Diplomatic Conference in Nairobi over the 
revision of the Paris Convention that forced developed countries to shift 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO forum. 
D.  The Self-interest Narrative 
The final narrative is the self-interest narrative.  In an article that 
sought to respond to the bargain narrative, Edmund Kitch offered an 
alternative story that suggested that less developed countries agreed to 
stronger intellectual property protection because they found such 
protection in their self-interests.22  Focusing on the patent system, he 
found three reasons why less developed countries were interested in 
implementing stronger protection called for by the TRIPs Agreement.  
First, “[t]echnology does not simply consist of a collection of 
instructions as to how to proceed, and patents do not, standing alone, 
contain the necessary information.”23  As Professor Kitch put it 
memorably, “technology is not a collection of recipes[,] and patents are 
not a cookbook.”24  Second, the technology needed by those countries is 
unique and, therefore, different from what developed countries need.25  
Third, “the ability of patent owners to charge for the use of their patent 
rights, either in the form of royalties or through end product prices[,] is 
constrained by the ability of the country granting the patent rights to 
pay.”26  The economic impact of stronger patent protection on less 
developed countries is therefore limited, because they, as poor 
countries, pay less than the more wealthy counterparts for patent use.27 
 
21. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past, 
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1065 (1968). 
22. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 166 (1994). 
23. Id. at 171; see also id. at 171–76 (discussing how patents alone might not contain all 
the necessary information to promote technological advances). 
24. Id. at 171. 
25. See id. at 176–77. 
26. Id. at 171. 
27. This argument ignores the fact that patent rights holders might decide to withhold 
their technology from less developed countries because the royalties or product prices 
available in those countries are too low to be attractive.  It therefore understates the 
economic impact created by the lack of access to unaffordable technologies needed by less 
developed countries. 
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These benefits are important to less developed countries, as 
knowledge production is cumulative,28 and it takes time for the 
intellectual property system to develop.  As Rochelle Dreyfuss noted 
insightfully, there is a major difference between the decision by 
policymakers to forgo the manufacture of automobiles and the decision 
to forgo the development of an intellectual property system: 
The decision to forgo the manufacture of, say, automobiles is not 
permanent.  Should a nation decide it no longer wishes to rely on 
foreign supply, or should the market for motor vehicles grow 
more lucrative, there is nothing in the GATT to prevent the 
citizens of that nation from entering the automobile sector.  The 
same is not true of intellectual property.  Innovation is 
knowledge-intensive.  Educating a citizenry to the level where it 
is technically and culturally sophisticated enough to innovate at 
globally competitive levels may become prohibitively expensive 
once intellectual property rights are recognized.  Thus, unless 
some concession is made to user interests, any nation that is now 
behind will likely stay there.29 
Notwithstanding the benefits of intellectual property protection, 
countries sometimes might not be able to implement policy changes that 
are in their best interests, at least in the best interests of the country as a 
whole.  As Professor Kitch explained in the patent context: 
If patent protection is weak or non-existent, industries will 
develop that rely for their existence on their ability to ignore the 
international patent system.  Once these industries have 
developed, they have an interest in resisting any change in the 
rules.  Although it may be in the overall, long run interest of the 
country to participate in both form and substance in the 
international patent system, the adversely affected industries will 
have incentives to expend their political capital to keep that from 
happening.  Thus even if full participation is as a theoretical 
matter the optimum strategy in the long run, once a country 
departs from that strategy it may find that internal political 
forces block a return to the optimum.  Outsiders can play a 
constructive role by insisting that the issues be addressed within 
a larger and principled framework.30 
 
28. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II:  Should Users Strike Back?, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004). 
29. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
30. Kitch, supra note 22, at 178; see also Robert P. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms:  
Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 243–44 (1990) [hereinafter Merges, 
Battle of the Lateralisms] (observing that “representatives of the ‘pirate’ industries may have 
enough political clout to block the proposed changes” even though those changes might be in 
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In that scenario, multilateral negotiations such as the TRIPs 
Agreement become important, as they “plac[e] larger interests of the 
nation at risk in the negotiations . . . [and] invite participation from 
larger economic players who can offset the political influence of the 
entrenched pirate groups.”31  Nevertheless, it is mistaken to assume that 
pirate industries are always “overrepresented” in the legislative 
processes of those less developed countries that opposed stronger 
intellectual property protection.32  Moreover, as I pointed out elsewhere 
in the context of U.S.-led intellectual property reform efforts in China, 
foreign pushes have serious limitations and sometimes may backfire on 
those pushing the policy.33 
In sum, the self-interest narrative provides a convincing explanation 
why less developed countries need to embrace stronger intellectual 
property protection.  As Professor Kitch noted in the beginning of his 
article, “[t]he purpose is to identify issues that technologically deprived 
countries must face if they desire to encourage the development of 
enhanced domestic technological capability, based on the assumption 
that their system of intellectual property resembles the American 
system—as the GATT agreement requires.”34  Because the article is 
“conceptual,”35 the narrative it advanced sits uneasily with the historical 
facts advanced by the three other narratives. 
For example, the self-interest narrative directly contradicts the 
coercion narrative, which posits that the TRIPs Agreement was imposed 
upon less developed countries against their self-interests.  It also sits 
uneasily with the ignorance narrative, which holds that less developed 
countries failed to understand the importance of intellectual property 
protection during the TRIPs negotiations.  Moreover, the self-interest 
narrative challenges the bargain narrative by suggesting that negotiators 
from developed countries had given their less developed counterparts 
concessions in other areas even though it is in their adversaries’ self-
interests to sign on to the TRIPs Agreement.  Given their 
 
the best interests of a country as a whole). 
31. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms, supra note 30, at 244. 
32. See id. (maintaining that “[t]here is no reason to assume that pirate industries are 
overrepresented in the legislative processes of all countries that oppose broadened rights”). 
33. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 437–42 (2003) 
(discussing the limitations of a coercive foreign intellectual property policy); see also Peter K. 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners:  Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First 
Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140–54 (2000) (discussing the cycle of futility in the U.S. 
foreign intellectual property policy toward China). 
34. Kitch, supra note 22, at 167. 
35. Id. 
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sophistication, these negotiators are unlikely to be as ineffective as the 
ignorance narrative has suggested. 
E.  Summary 
The TRIPs Agreement had very complex origins.  It is very difficult 
to pinpoint how the Agreement was created.  Thus, instead of 
attempting the impossible task of suggesting which narrative is correct, 
this Article highlights the tension between the different, and sometimes 
competing, narratives in the hope that readers will have a better 
understanding of the background behind the TRIPs negotiations and be 
able to draw their own conclusions. 
II.  THE PRESENT 
Since the TRIPs Agreement went into effect, less developed 
countries have been very dissatisfied with the international intellectual 
property system.  Commentators generally attribute this discontent to 
the ten-year-old Agreement.  While these commentators were correct in 
making this link, less developed countries are more frustrated with the 
larger WTO system than with the TRIPs Agreement.  This Part focuses 
primarily on the bargain narrative, but it also touches on the ignorance 
and self-interest narratives.  It, however, omits a large portion of the 
coercion narrative, because such a narrative, by definition, assumes the 
existence of an unfair international trading system and, therefore, 
suggests discontent among less developed countries. 
Let us start with the bargain narrative.  If one is to believe that the 
TRIPs Agreement is a compromise, empirical records have indicated 
that less developed countries not only got a bad bargain, as some would 
say, but also a failed bargain.  Although developed countries promised 
to reduce tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural and textile areas in 
exchange for stronger intellectual property protection and wider market 
access, they failed to honor these promises.36  This failure was 
highlighted in the recent WTO debacle in Cancún, in which less 
developed countries were disillusioned from the process and became 
 
36. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. RIGHTS & DEV. POLICY:  REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
RIGHTS 8 (2003) [hereinafter IPR COMM’N REPORT] (noting that many less developed 
countries “feel that the commitments made by developed countries to liberalise agriculture 
and textiles and reduce tariffs, have not been honoured, while they have to live with the 
burdens of the TRIPS agreement”); SELL, supra note 11, at 173 (stating that “there is . . . no 
evidence that developed countries are making good on their commitments to open their 
markets more widely to developing countries’ agricultural and textile exports”). 
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unwilling to negotiate other issues, such as investment, competition 
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.37 
Even if these countries were able to obtain what they bargained for 
during the TRIPs negotiations, the Agreement would remain 
problematic because they would still come out as a group of “loser” 
countries.  The twenty-first century is primarily about the knowledge-
based economy, rather than agriculture and manufacturing industries.38  
Gains by less developed countries in the areas of agriculture and 
textiles, therefore, would not make up for losses in the intellectual 
property and information technology areas.  In fact, by conceding 
positions in the latter, less developed countries would be required to 
play catch-up using an outdated competition model. 
Moreover, intellectual property protection often spills over into 
other areas, and “[i]ncreasingly, agricultural goods are the subject of 
intellectual property rights as patents are extended to seeds and 
plants.”39  As a study by the World Bank has shown, less developed 
countries could lose up to $20 billion if the TRIPs Agreement were fully 
implemented.40  Even worse, some commentators have pointed out that 
“the implementation of international IP rules represents a net short-
term financial loss that, it may be plausibly argued, is unlikely to be 
offset by economic and social gains for a very long time.”41  Even if these 
countries are able to obtain gains in selected areas, there is no guarantee 
that the wealth will be transferred from the beneficiary sectors to the 
disadvantaged ones.42  As a result, the disparity of wealth between the 
 
37. See sources cited supra note 5. 
38. See, e.g., LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH:  THE NEW RULES FOR 
INDIVIDUALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (2000). 
39. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:  WHO 
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 11 (2002). 
40. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 2002, at xvii (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002 
/Resources/gep2002complete.pdf (noting that “[i]f TRIPS were fully implemented, rent 
transfers to major technology-creating countries—particularly the United States, Germany, 
and France—in the form of pharmaceutical patents, computer chip designs, and other 
intellectual property, would amount to more than $20 billion”). 
41. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Foreword to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:  DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, at x (Christophe Bellmann et al. 
eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE]. 
42. As Frederick Abbott noted in the context of pharmaceuticals: 
The problem with . . . using net economic gains or losses as the developing country 
benchmark is that gains for a developing country’s textile or agricultural producers 
do not directly translate into higher public or private health expenditures . . . .  
Salaries for part of the workforce may increase and government tax revenues may 
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rich and the poor in these countries will grow. 
Policymakers and industry groups from developed countries have 
challenged these claims by suggesting that stronger intellectual property 
protection would allow countries to use the system to “leap frog” their 
economies.  Indeed, in painting the self-interest narrative, Edmund 
Kitch provided very strong justifications for adopting stronger 
intellectual property protection.  Unfortunately, scholars and 
commentators thus far have been unable to demonstrate empirically 
how stronger protection would benefit less developed countries and 
how such protection would maximize global welfare.43  When Congress 
undertook a critical examination of the American patent system, one of 
its experts, Fritz Machlup, could not help but conclude that he could not 
say for certain whether the patent system was good for his country.  As 
he remarked famously in a widely-cited quote: 
If one does not know whether a system . . . is good or bad, the 
safest “policy conclusion” is to “muddle through”—either with it, 
if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has lived without 
it.  If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, 
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences to recommend instituting one.  But since we have 
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.44 
In fact, many commentators, especially those who found the 
coercion narrative convincing, have suggested that the existing 
 
rise, and this may indirectly help offset pharmaceutical price increases.  However, in 
order for the health sector not to be adversely affected, there must be some form of 
transfer payment, whether in the form of increased public health expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals, by providing health insurance benefits, or other affirmative acts.  
In a world of economic scarcity, the prospect that governments will act to offset 
increases in medicines prices with increased public health expenditures is uncertain. 
Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction:  Developments and Trends in 
Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 33 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006). 
43. See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin 
America:  Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 109, 126 
(1997); see also Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual 
Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 103–05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (urging 
countries to develop their intellectual property rights regime according to their own needs); 
Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
141, 152 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that an international regime may not yield 
overall welfare benefits and that actors outside the regime may suffer). 
44. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF 
THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup). 
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intellectual property system became universal only because it was 
backed by great economic and military might.45  The existing system, 
therefore, does not embody universal values.  Rather, it was successfully 
transplanted to less developed countries because they were less 
powerful and had been subjected to colonial rule during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
The lack of empirical support is particularly troublesome, because 
intellectual property systems require balance, and overprotection is just 
as dangerous as underprotection.  As Rochelle Dreyfuss pointed out, 
“[k]nowledge production is a cumulative enterprise; the storehouse of 
information does not grow unless creators have the freedom to learn 
from, and build on, earlier work.”46  Thus, if the system overprotects, 
intellectual creators will not have enough raw materials to develop their 
creations, and the public will not have adequate access to the needed 
information and knowledge.  In contrast, if the system underprotects, 
intellectual creators will not have adequate incentives to create.  Many 
of them will find the system unfair and unattractive and will prefer to 
take up other, more remunerative jobs. 
To make matters worse, an inappropriate intellectual property 
system would hurt less developed countries more than it would hurt 
their developed counterparts.  While developed countries may have the 
resources and regulatory mechanisms to reduce the impact of an 
unbalanced system, the same does not apply to less developed 
countries.47  Many of these countries lack the national economic 
 
45. See, e.g., ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 93 (1996) (“[W]hether or not [intellectual property] was 
consciously designed to serve economic policies in any of the [industrialized countries], it has 
always evolved in response to economic and political necessity.”); William P. Alford, How 
Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter:  American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in 
East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 17 (1994); see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE 
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:  AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND 
THE LAW 247 (1998) (stating that “[t]he range of Western beliefs that define intellectual and 
cultural property laws . . . are not universal values that express the full range of human 
possibility, but particular, interested fictions emergent from a history of colonialism that has 
disempowered many of the world’s peoples”); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 92 (1996) (noting that Western 
culture and ideology are sometimes attractive because they are linked to hard economic and 
military power). 
46. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 22. 
47. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 4; see MASKUS, supra note 16, at 237 
(noting that developed countries “have mature legal systems of corrective interventions” in 
which “the exercise of IPRs threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social 
terms”); Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that although “[t]he TRIPS Agreement 
recognizes that members may need law to control the abuse of intellectual property rights, . . . 
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strengths and established legal mechanisms to overcome problems 
created by an unbalanced system.  Even if the system is beneficial in the 
long run, these countries might lack the needed wealth, infrastructure, 
and technological base to take advantage of the opportunities created 
by the system in the short run.48 
Thus, it is no surprise that less developed countries have been 
concerned about the heightened protection required by the TRIPs 
Agreement and its deleterious impact in the areas of agriculture, health, 
environment, education, and culture.  They are also disappointed and 
disturbed by the fact that their developed counterparts, through the 
enactment of the TRIPs Agreement, have “kicked away the ladder” 
that would have allowed them to catch up and climb to economic 
success.49  As one commentator noted: 
From the start of the industrial revolution, every country that 
became economically great began by copying:  the Germans 
copied the British; the Americans copied the British and the 
Germans, and the Japanese copied everybody.  The trust of the 
TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that this process of growth by 
copying and learning by doing will never happen again.50 
Unfortunately, for less developed countries, this story of discontent 
did not end with the TRIPs Agreement.  Today, many developed 
countries have sought to ratchet up their protection by negotiating 
around the TRIPs Agreement, seeking what commentators have called 
“TRIPs-plus” protection.51  In recent years, for example, the European 
Communities and the United States have used bilateral and plurilateral 
 
countries that did not have enforceable intellectual property laws prior to joining the WTO 
had little reason to develop competition law to control right holders” (footnote omitted)). 
48. See MASKUS, supra note 16, at 237 (noting that “[l]ong-run gains would come at the 
expense of costlier access in the medium term”). 
49. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:  DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002). 
50. William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]. 
51. Many commentators have become concerned about the “one-way ratchet” of 
intellectual property protection.  Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 22; see LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 
(2003).  But see Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 183 (2004) (highlighting public actions taken to invigorate the public domain). 
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free trade agreements to strengthen their protection.52 
To be certain, there are some benefits to using bilateral and 
plurilateral treaties.  For example, they are more effective in addressing 
the individual concerns and circumstances of the contracting parties.53  
They also enable parties to resolve difficult transnational problems in a 
more expeditious manner.54  Indeed, by using standardized terms, the 
United States successfully used free trade agreements to maximize the 
effectiveness and efficiency of its negotiation strategy in the 
international trade area.  As Peter Drahos observed, 
the BIT [bilateral investment treaty] which the United States 
signed with Nicaragua in 1995 was based on the prototype that 
the United States had developed for such treaties in 1994.  
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that the United 
States has negotiated with Jordan will serve as a model for the 
other FTAs being negotiated with Chile and Singapore.55 
However, the bilateral or plurilateral negotiation strategy remains 
disturbing to countries that reluctantly joined the TRIPs Agreement to 
avoid unilateral trade sanctions, as the bargain narrative has suggested.  
Because most of the items negotiated under the bilateral and 
 
52. For excellent discussions of the recent bilateral and plurilateral free trade 
agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD:  THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS 
(FTAA) (2003), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA(A4).pdf; Carlos M. 
Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:  Defeating the WTO System for Access to 
Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in 
Intellectual Property]; Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:  Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001) [hereinafter Drahos, BITs and BIPs]; Richard E. 
Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade Arrangements, 26 WORLD 
ECON. 1019 (2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?  Pendulum Swings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004) [hereinafter Okediji, 
Back to Bilateralism?]. 
53. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 139 (2001) (noting that the lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to the 
1995 China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights “imposed more detailed 
procedural obligations than could be provided in a multilateral agreement such as TRIPS”); 
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 339 (1993) (contending that “[b]ilateral agreements 
provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the contentious issues surrounding 
intellectual property protection”).  For discussions of bilateral agreements, see C. Michael 
Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a Blunder:  What the New President Should Do, 22 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25 (1989), Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy:  The Case for Bilateral 
Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1989), and Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms, supra 
note 30. 
54. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:  
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 295 (1991). 
55. Drahos, BITs and BIPs, supra note 52, at 794. 
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plurilateral agreements were considered outside the scope of the TRIPs 
Agreement, the Agreement would not shield less developed countries 
from trade sanctions.  Thus, less developed countries were in no better 
position, as far as unilateral sanctions are concerned, than they would 
have been had they not signed the TRIPs Agreement. 
More problematically, the recent free trade agreements came at a 
time when the intellectual property system was under siege domestically 
in the developed world.  As the ignorance narrative has shown, 
intellectual property was not of popular interest until recently.56  Instead 
of obscure and technical issues that have no relevance to daily lives, less 
developed countries now see intellectual property as very important to 
them.  In light of this changing perspective and the resulting resistance 
to the expansion of intellectual property rights at home, Keith Maskus 
and Jerome Reichman were right to note that it was very difficult to find 
it “timely to harmonize and elevate international standards of patent 
protection—even if that were demonstrably beneficial—when there is so 
little agreement in the US itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional 
apparatus that often seems out of control.”57 
In addition to free trade agreements, the increasing use of 
technological protection measures by intellectual property rights 
holders in developed countries has elicited concerns among 
policymakers in the less developed world.  By using these alternative 
protection measures, rights holders in developed countries are now able 
to lock up materials that otherwise would be available to less developed 
countries.58  The 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, for example, require 
measures that prevent the circumvention of copy-protection 
technologies used to protect copyrighted works in digital media.59  The 
 
56. See SELL, supra note 11, at 99 (“To a certain extent IP law is reminiscent of the 
Catholic Church when the Bible was in Latin.  IP lawyers are privileged purveyors of 
expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy.”). 
57. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 300 (2004) 
(footnote omitted). 
58. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 106 (“For developing countries, where 
Internet connectivity is limited and subscriptions to on-line resources unaffordable, it may 
exclude access to these materials altogether and impose a heavy burden that will delay the 
participation of those countries in the global knowledge-based society.”); Peter K. Yu, The 
Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2005) (discussing increasing anti-circumvention protection 
and the growing erosion of the fair use/fair dealing privilege). 
59. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).  For 
comprehensive discussions of the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, see generally MIHÀLY 
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deployment of genetic use restriction technologies, which are generally 
known as GURTs or “terminator” technologies, also could render seeds 
sterile, thus making it physically impossible for them to grow a second 
crop.60 
In sum, the TRIPs Agreement has provided many reasons why less 
developed countries are dissatisfied with the current international 
intellectual property system.  However, the Agreement alone does not 
result in the current state of dissatisfaction.  New developments, such as 
the increasing use of TRIPs-plus free trade agreements as well as the 
growing use of technological protection measures, have made the 
system unbearable. 
III.  THE FUTURE 
In light of the growing discontent among less developed countries 
and the inequitable nature of the existing international intellectual 
property system, many commentators have called for a radical 
reassessment of the existing system.  For example, Samuel Oddi has 
suggested ways to alleviate the adverse impact of the Paris Convention.61  
Alan Story contended that “it is in the interests of countries of the 
South that [the Berne Convention] be repealed and a new framework 
be established on radically different grounds.”62  This Article, however, 
does not call for either a complete overhaul or the abandonment of the 
TRIPs Agreement.  Rather, it takes the position that the Agreement is 
here to stay and explores, from that standpoint, how less developed 
countries can take advantage of the Agreement and reform the 
international intellectual property system.  This Part proposes eight 
courses of action. 
 
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET:  THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002), and JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON 
LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996:  THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY AND THE WIPO 
PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY (2002). 
60. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 60.  For a discussion of the impact of 
GURTs on less developed countries, see generally Timothy Swanson & Timo Goeschl, 
Diffusion and Distribution:  The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological Enforcement 
Within the Biotechnology Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 50, at 669. 
61. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World 
Development:  Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 855–65. 
62. Alan Story, Burn Berne:  Why the Leading International Copyright Convention 
Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 769 (2003). 
YU - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:30:56 PM 
2006] TRIPS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 387 
 
A.  Interpret the TRIPs Agreement Through a Pro-Development Lens 
As the bargain narrative has taught us, the TRIPs Agreement was 
partly the result of a compromise between developed and less 
developed countries.  While the WTO member states settled on a wide 
array of issues, which range from minimum standards of intellectual 
property protection to the inclusion of the mandatory dispute 
settlement process, they compromised on many others and refused to 
agree on a select few.63  Thus, the existing Agreement contains many 
“constructive ambiguities”64 that provide countries with “wiggle room,” 
or “policy space,” to implement the Agreement.65  By interpreting the 
Agreement to take advantage of these ambiguities, less developed 
countries may be able to push for language that meets their needs while 
preserving the national autonomy appropriately reserved to them 
during the negotiation process.  They might also be able to use these 
provisions as a bulwark against the continuous expansion of intellectual 
property rights, which, in turn, may allow less developed countries to 
“‘claw[]’ back much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in 
TRIPS.”66 
Consider, for example, the word “review” in article 27(3)(b) of the 
TRIPs Agreement, which concerns the patentability of diagnostic, 
 
63. The exhaustion issue is a prime example of the failure by the developed and less 
developed countries to come to an agreement.  Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement stipulated 
that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.”  TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6; see also Vincent 
Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree:  The WTO, TRIPs, International IPR 
Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333 (2000) (discussing the 
disagreement over the exhaustion issue during the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement).  
Even though the WTO member states “agree to disagree” on the exhaustion issue, recent 
developments seem to suggest that the European Communities and the United States have 
been using bilateral and regional free trade agreements to negotiate around the TRIPs 
Agreement.  For example, the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement “deals with 
the exhaustion issue by requiring each Party to give the patent owner a remedy against a third 
party who disturbs a contractual arrangement between a patent owner and licensee.”  Peter 
Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property:  Intellectual Property Owners and Their 
Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 60 (2004) (citing 
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.7.2, May 6, 2003, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/singapore.htm). 
64. WATAL, supra note 3, at 7. 
65. See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:  Global Competition Under 
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 28 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman, 
From Free Riders to Fair Followers] (contending that “the TRIPS Agreement leaves 
developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ in which to implement national policies favoring 
the public interest in free competition”). 
66. WATAL, supra note 3, at 7. 
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therapeutic, and surgical methods and plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms.  As Carlos Correa pointed out, “there ha[d] been no 
agreement in the Council for TRIPS on the meaning of ‘review.’”67  
While developed countries would have interpreted the word to mean 
“review of implementation,” less developed countries were likely to 
interpret the word to suggest the possibility for “revising” the 
Agreement to meet their needs and interests.68 
How the treaty is interpreted ultimately will affect the rights and 
obligations of less developed countries.  Thus, it is very important to 
interpret the TRIPs Agreement through a pro-development lens.  It is 
also essential to develop a model law that is “development friendly,” or 
a set of model intellectual property systems that take account of local 
needs.  These model laws and systems will serve as a good starting point 
for international negotiations, especially in light of the recent 
proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements.  They 
are also important because many less developed countries still lack 
experience with intellectual property protection and the needed human 
capital to develop laws that are tailored to their interests and local 
conditions.69  As a result, they might have no option but to “meet their 
TRIPS obligations by simply transcribing its mandates into law.”70 
This is problematic because the TRIPs Agreement focuses primarily 
on laying out the minimum standards of intellectual property protection, 
as compared to describing the different possible intellectual property 
systems.  Consider, for example, the well-illustrated example of trade 
secret protection.  “[S]ince TRIPS does not mention a right to reverse 
engineer [which exists in the United States], transcription would create 
a level of protection surpassing that found in the United States, where 
the right to copy is privileged.”71  The unexamined transcription of the 
TRIPs Agreement into law, therefore, might result in an unbalanced 
intellectual property system. 
Most recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) teamed up to implement the 
 
67. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 211 (2000). 
68. See id. 
69. See Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 25 (noting that many less developed countries 
“experience with intellectual property protection [and] sufficient human capital (in the form 
of legal talent) to codify wiggles into law”). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights and 
Sustainable Development.  Among the achievements of this project is 
the publication of the Resource Book on TRIPS and Development.72  
Conceived as a practical guide to the TRIPs Agreement, the book seeks 
to improve understanding of the development implications of the 
Agreement.  It offers detailed analysis of each provision of the 
Agreement and highlights areas in which the Agreement leaves WTO 
member states “wiggle room” to pursue their own policy objectives 
based on their levels of development.  While one might disagree on the 
authors’ interpretation of the Agreement, it is hard to ignore the 
importance and promise of this project. 
Like interpretation, how one frames the intellectual property debate 
is equally important, because such framing might affect the 
receptiveness of the WTO member states to the demands, or perhaps 
pleas, of the less developed world.  As Susan Sell noted insightfully, 
“grants talk” is preferable to “rights talk” from the standpoint of 
international development, because it “highlights the fact that what may 
be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with other 
important goals,”73 such as freedom of expression, public health, and 
protection of human rights.  Rights talk, by contrast, is likely to 
encourage policymakers to focus on the entitlement of the rights holders 
while ignoring the public interest safeguards of and the potential 
conflicts created by those rights. 
B.  Explore the Public Interest Safeguards in the TRIPs Agreement 
While the TRIPs Agreement created many obligations in less 
developed countries, some of which are also new to developed 
countries,74 it also includes many important public interest safeguards.  
Commentators have noted the importance of articles 7 and 8 of the 
Agreement, which provide a basis for seeking waivers “to meet 
 
72. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004). 
73. SELL, supra note 11, at 146. 
74. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 365 (noting that changes 
required by the TRIPs Agreement “were dramatic for less developed countries, as they went 
beyond just intellectual property and affected such other areas as agriculture, health, 
environment, education, and culture”); see also WATAL, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that “at 
least one, undisclosed information, has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement 
before, and another, protection for integrated circuit designs, had no effective international 
treaty, while others, like plant variety protection or performers’ rights, were geographically 
limited”). 
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unforeseen conditions of hardship.”75  As Jerome Reichman explained: 
[C]ountries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in 
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways.  The least destructive 
approach would be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to 
recommend narrowly described waivers to meet specified 
circumstances for a limited period of time.  This approach would 
strengthen the mediatory powers of the Council for TRIPS and 
help to offset the problems arising from the inability of that body 
to quash or stay requests for consultations and dispute-
settlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments. 
 Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to 
complaints of nullification and impairment under Article 64 
might invoke the application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet 
unforeseen conditions of hardship.  This defense, if properly 
grounded and supported by factual evidence, could persuade the 
Appellate Body either to admit the existence of a tacit doctrine 
of frustration built into the aforementioned articles or to buttress 
those articles by reaching out to the general doctrine of 
frustration recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  Either way, overly aggressive complainants could wind 
up with what would amount to a judicially imposed waiver.76 
In addition, there are many other important provisions in the TRIPs 
Agreement that less developed countries could use to their advantage.  
For example, article 4 of the Agreement provides that “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
the nationals of all other Members.” 77  It therefore may constrain 
reciprocal clauses that are increasingly used by developed countries in 
their free trade agreements.78  Article 27(2) allows WTO member states 
to exclude certain inventions from patentability provided that the 
prevention of the commercial exploitation of those inventions “is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment.”79  Article 30 enables member states to “provide 
 
75. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age:  Conflict or Cooperation with 
the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 461 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
76. Id. at 461–62 (footnote omitted). 
77. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4. 
78. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 380 (discussing the tension 
between reciprocity provisions and article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement). 
79. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(2). 
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limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,”80 on the 
condition that such exceptions satisfy the three-step test—i.e., they “do 
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”81  
Article 31 lays down the conditions in which member states can use 
patented products without the right holder’s authorization “in the case 
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”82  
Article 73 stipulates exceptions for member states to pursue their 
essential security interests and to fulfill obligations under the United 
Nations Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace 
and security.83 
Until recently, although the WTO dispute settlement panels at times 
had “referred to these [limitations and public interest safeguards] 
favorably,” the legal literature and WTO panel decisions have 
underexplored them.84  Thus, it is very important to highlight them and 
develop strategies that help inject them into WTO panel decisions.  As 
Gregory Shaffer explained, it is important to develop WTO 
jurisprudence through the dispute settlement process: 
Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more 
important than is participation in analogous judicial processes for 
shaping law in national systems.  The difficulty of amending or 
interpreting WTO law through the WTO political process 
enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence.  WTO law requires 
consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with 
rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating 
rounds.  Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often 
 
80. Id. art. 30. 
81. Id.  This three-step test, however, “is not a public interest limitation to exclusive 
rights.  Instead, it is a limitation on the scope of limitations that member states can implement 
to promote access and dissemination of works domestically.”  Ruth L. Okediji, Fostering 
Access to Education, Research and Dissemination of Knowledge Through Copyright 3–4, 
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Okideiji_Bellagio4.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Okediji, Fostering Access to Education].  Thus, the three-
step test circumscribes the scope of a state’s discretion to create limitations and exceptions to 
rights in its national intellectual property laws.  Cf. Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core 
International Copyright Norm:  The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1 (2005) (proposing to create a new international copyright norm that is in harmony with the 
U.S. fair use doctrine based on the Berne Convention’s three-step test). 
82. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31. 
83. Id. art. 73. 
84. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 23 (citing Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products, § 7.26, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000)). 
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are drafted in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power 
to the WTO dispute settlement system to effectively make WTO 
law through interpretation. 
 As a result of the increased importance of WTO 
jurisprudence and the rigidity of the WTO political process, 
those governments that are able to participate most actively in 
the WTO dispute settlement system are best-positioned to 
effectively shape the law’s interpretation and application over 
time.85 
C.  Take Advantage of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process 
One of the major strengths of the TRIPs Agreement is the 
mandatory dispute settlement process.86  As Rochelle Dreyfuss and 
Andreas Lowenfeld entitled their article, the two achievements of the 
Uruguay Round are Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together.87  
In the first few years since its establishment, the dispute settlement 
process had been used primarily by developed countries.88  It is no 
surprise that the first intellectual property dispute to reach the Dispute 
Settlement Body concerned the United States’ challenge to the 
noncompliance of India’s patent system with the TRIPs Agreement.89 
However, as the Agreement matures, less developed countries have 
begun to use the process more frequently.90  As William Davey pointed 
 
85. Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement:  Who 
Participates?  Who Decides?  The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 459, 470 (2004).  But see Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27 (contending that 
negotiation within the WTO membership might be more effective than using the dispute 
settlement process in effectuating the recognition of positive rights in the TRIPs Agreement). 
86. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 63–64 (requiring all disputes arising 
under the TRIPs Agreement to be settled by the WTO dispute settlement process). 
87. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the 
Uruguay Round:  Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275 
(1997); see also William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System:  The First Ten Years, 
8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System] 
(noting that “[d]ispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO”); Ruth Okediji, 
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 149–50 (2000) 
[hereinafter Okediji, International Fair Use Doctrine] (noting that “[o]ne of the most 
celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is the dispute resolution mechanism which 
adds legitimacy to the overall design of the new trading system” (footnote omitted)). 
88. See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 17 (noting that “[t]he 
first half of [the first ten years’ operation of the WTO dispute settlement process]—from 1995 
through 1999—was characterized by extensive use of the system by the United States initially, 
and later by the EU”). 
89. Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997). 
90. See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 24 (noting that “the 
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out: 
In the first five years of the system’s existence, developing 
countries initiated by themselves roughly one-quarter of the 
consultation requests.  In the four and one-half years from 2000 
to June 2004, developing countries initiated 62% of the 
consultation requests—more than doubling their relative share of 
initiations. . . . Thus, in the last few years developing countries 
have become more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement, 
both in absolute and relative terms.  Interestingly, the majority of 
those cases have involved developing country respondents.  That 
is to say, developing countries seem to have found the WTO 
dispute settlement system to be a useful mechanism to deal with 
a wide range of trade disputes—using it not only against 
developed countries, but also in their trading relations with other 
developing countries.91 
A case in point is Brazil, which has made extensive use of the system 
in its dealings with other less developed countries, in particular those in 
South America.92  Cases brought by the country “involved trade 
remedies imposed by Argentina (textile safeguards; poultry 
antidumping duties); Mexico (antidumping duties on transformers); 
Peru (countervailing duties on buses); and Turkey (antidumping duties 
on pipe fittings).”93  Most recently, the tiny Caribbean islands of Antigua 
and Barbuda successfully defeated the United States in their challenge 
of U.S. laws against Internet and telephone gambling.94  Ironically, the 
United States Trade Representative declared “victory” after the WTO 
Appellate Body narrowed the earlier panel decision by upholding only 
some of the U.S. laws.95 
To be certain, there are still many problems with the dispute 
 
US and the EC no longer were as dominant as complainants in the system,” and that 
“developing country use of the system increased dramatically” in the second half of the first 
decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement process). 
91. Id. 
92. See id. 
93. Id. at 41. 
94. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). 
95. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Internet Gambling 
Restrictions Can Stand as U.S. Wins Key Issues in WTO Dispute, Apr. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov (declaring that “[t]he United States won an important victory today when 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body sided with the United States on key 
issues in a challenge to U.S. laws on internet gambling”); see also Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
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settlement process, such as the lack of transparency of the institution, 
limited access by non-Members to the dispute settlement process, the 
technical and financial difficulties confronting less developed countries 
in their implementation of the treaty obligations, the insensitivity and 
undemocratic nature of the decision-making process, and the lack of 
accountability of policymakers to the global citizenry.96  The United 
States’ recent attempt to substitute compensation for compliance in its 
dispute with the European Communities over the Fairness in Music 
Licensing Act of 1998 also raises concerns that the WTO system might 
not equally protect developed and less developed countries.97  Indeed, as 
one commentator noted, the United States’ approach might encourage 
other WTO member states “to replace effective enforcement of 
intellectual property rights with a cynical ‘exemptions plus 
compensation’ approach to TRIPS.”98  Such an approach, therefore, 
might undercut the minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection under the TRIPs Agreement while creating instability in the 
international trading system. 
Notwithstanding these shortfalls, the WTO dispute settlement 
process offers promise to less developed countries.  As Professor 
Shaffer pointed out, the strategies used by less developed countries in 
the WTO process will “have implications for their leverage in 
international political negotiations and for the policy space in which 
they implement domestic intellectual property and public health 
regimes.”99  The use of the dispute settlement process may even help 
lower the negotiation costs.  As he explained: 
 
96. For sources discussing the structural defects of the World Trade Organization, see 
Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 13, at 585–86. 
97. See Award of the Arbitrators, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act:  Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 
9, 2001) (determining the award at €1,219,900 per year).  For excellent discussions of the 
dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of 
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001), and 
Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage:  A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of 
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000). 
98. Richard Owens, TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration:  The Repercussions, 
25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 49, 53 (2003).  Compare John H. Jackson, International Law 
Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:  Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109 (2004) (articulating a view that the result of a WTO dispute settlement 
panel report “is to create an international law obligation to comply with that report”), with 
Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002) (examining the 
WTO dispute settlement process using the economic theory of contract remedies and the 
concept of “efficient breach”). 
99. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 476–77. 
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[P]articipation in WTO political and judicial processes are 
complementary.  The shadow of WTO judicial processes shape 
bilateral negotiations, just as political processes and contexts 
inform judicial decisions.  If developing countries can clarify 
their public goods priorities and coordinate their strategies, then 
they will more effectively advance their interests in bargaining 
conducted in WTO law’s shadow, and in WTO legal complaints 
heard in the shadow of bargaining.  They, in turn, will be better 
prepared to exploit the ‘flexibilities’ of the TRIPS Agreement, 
tailoring their intellectual property laws accordingly, and will 
gain confidence in their ability to ward off US and EC threats 
against their policy choices.100 
To level the playing field and enable less developed countries to take 
greater advantage of the dispute settlement process, the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law was established to provide legal advice and 
support in WTO matters and to train government officials in WTO 
law.101  India, for example, has been “a relatively frequent user” of this 
Centre.102  Unfortunately, the Centre is understaffed and has only a 
small number of lawyers who have to be prepared to litigate all of the 
WTO agreements.103  Moreover, because the Centre focuses primarily 
on WTO dispute settlement, it does not satisfy all of the needs of less 
developed countries, which “need to coordinate political and judicial 
strategies since intellectual property matters are advanced in a strategic 
fashion before multiple fora.”104 
Thus, Professor Shaffer proposed to “pool . . . resources through 
national, regional, and international centers specializing in trade-related 
intellectual property issues.”105  As he maintained, “[r]egional centers 
could create benchmarks for policy, provide a forum for the sharing of 
experiences, and identify best practices.  [They] could also better 
coordinate training of developing country officials and non-
governmental representatives.”106  In addition, the centers would 
develop human capital and know-how in WTO law that could be tapped 
 
100. Id. 
101. Information about the Advisory Centre on WTO Law is available at 
http://www.acwl.ch/. 
102. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 45. 
103. See Shaffer, supra note 85, at 478 (“The Advisory Centre has only seven lawyers 
who must be prepared to litigate over 19 WTO agreements.  It thus lacks specific expertise in 
trade-related intellectual property matters.”). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 477. 
106. Id. at 478. 
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for WTO matters, when needed.107  They also would enable countries to 
take advantage of their collective position as repeat players in WTO 
litigation and thus benefit from the greater economies of scale in 
deploying legal resources, even though they individually bring only a 
very  
small number of WTO cases vis-à-vis their developed counterparts.108  
As less developed countries are better able to take advantage of the 
WTO dispute settlement process, they will have more faith in the WTO 
system, which in turn will create more satisfaction and stability in the 
international trading system.109 
D.  Add Explicit Access Rights to the TRIPs Agreement 
One of the biggest deficiencies of the TRIPs Agreement and the 
existing international intellectual property system is the lack of explicit 
 
107. See id. at 474.  As Professor Shaffer explained: 
 Because of developing countries’ less frequent use of the WTO system and 
their lack of local legal capital, the alternative for a developing country to train 
internal lawyers with WTO expertise is typically worse than hiring expensive US or 
European outside legal counsel.  Training internal counsel entails a significant long-
term allocation of resources, which is not cost-effective if a country is not an active 
player in the litigation system.  Start-up costs are high and potential economies of 
scale low.  Moreover, where a developing country’s internal lawyers develop 
expertise and exhibit talent, they can be snatched up by private law firms that pay 
salaries against which governments in developing countries cannot compete. 
 Although lawyers regularly leave government in the United States for the 
private sector, the fact that they largely remain in Washington and often 
subsequently return to government as part of Washington’s ‘revolving door’ 
bureaucratic culture means that US trade authorities are much more likely to take 
advantage of their acquired expertise. . . . The spillover effects for developing 
countries, in contrast, are largely negative, since, once a developing country trade 
official leaves to work for the private sector in the United States or Europe, that 
individual is not available locally within the developing country and almost never 
returns to government service. 
Id. at 475. 
108. See id. 
109. As Professor Shaffer explained: 
 Developing countries’ perceptions of the WTO system also feed back on their 
awareness of whether they have legal defenses and claims available.  Where 
developing countries and their commercial constituents have little faith in the WTO 
system, they are less likely to develop mechanisms to detect manipulations and 
violations of WTO law that affect their interests.  Even when they become aware of 
measures against which they could invoke their legal rights, developing countries are 
less likely to develop pro-active strategies to defend these rights and interests if they 
believe that the system is structured in a way that they cannot do so in a cost-
effective manner. 
Id. at 475. 
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rights in obtaining public access to protected materials.110  Indeed, 
“[p]ublic interest objectives, typically represented by user groups such 
as libraries, educational institutions, research institutes, or non-
governmental organizations[,] were noticeably absent during TRIPS 
negotiations.”111  While the lack of explicit rights might be less 
problematic in a system where intellectual property rights are the 
exception, rather than the rule, such a lack becomes a major problem in 
today’s system where such rights are more the rule than the exception.112  
As Rochelle Dreyfuss noted, “[u]ser access did not need specific 
delineation when it was the background rule; only the exceptionalism of 
intellectual property rights required express definition.  But if the new 
background is proprietary control, then the exceptionalism of user rights 
now needs to be embedded into positive law.”113 
In recent years, commentators have pushed for proposals that call 
for greater protection of the fair use/fair dealing privilege.114  As 
Professor Dreyfuss explained: 
 
110. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 28 (arguing for the need to use the next round of 
GATT negotiations to add explicit user rights to the TRIPs Agreement); Okediji, 
International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 87, at 87 (arguing the lack of an international fair 
use doctrine in existing international copyright law and that “such a doctrine is vital for 
effectuating traditional copyright policy in a global market for copyrighted works as well as 
for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting intellectual property under the free trade 
system”).  As Professor Dreyfuss explained: 
[It is not surprising that the TRIPs Agreement] does little . . . to explicitly safeguard 
the interests of those who seek to use protected works. . . . Because the free traders 
who negotiated the GATT worked in an environment in which the core concern, 
reducing market barriers, was viewed as producing (at least in the long term) 
unmitigated welfare gains, they were not likely to appreciate the social importance, 
in TRIPS, of balancing proprietary interests against public access needs.  Moreover, 
to the extent that the United States was a prime mover in the Uruguay Round, its 
intent was to ease U.S. trade deficits by creating broader exclusive markets for 
intellectual products, a goal with rather a scant role for user rights.  As a result, the 
TRIPS Agreement specifies levels of protection that can be exceeded, but not easily 
diminished.  User interests are largely left to domestic practice through provisions 
like the famous (now notorious) “three-part” tests, which permit members to create 
limited derogations from protection, but only so long as they do not unreasonably 
conflict with normal exploitation of the protected work or unreasonably prejudice 
the right holder (taking into account, in the case of patents, the interests of third 
parties). 
Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 21. 
111. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, supra note 11, at 858. 
112. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:  
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
577, 587 (1999) (discussing “the shifting baseline in the intellectual property field”). 
113. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27. 
114. See sources cited supra note 110. 
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[E]xperience with the aspirational aspects of other constitutive 
agreements suggests that [the approach to stress the aspirational 
aspects of the TRIPs Agreement] has its limits.  Institutionally, 
dispute resolution panels and the Appellate Body are, at best, 
courts.  They are not well positioned to engage in the kind of 
lawmaking that can forge delicate balances among interests and 
create equilibria durable over a range of factual circumstances.  
Infusing content into precatory statements is, in any event, 
difficult, especially when antithetical interests are explicitly 
codified.115 
However, such proposals alone would not be enough to satisfy all of 
the needs of less developed countries—especially concerning their needs 
for education, research, and knowledge dissemination.  While less 
developed countries need fair use, they are in more desperate need of 
discounted bulk use, if not free use.116  Unless such use is considered 
“fair,” the international intellectual property system will need more 
reforms than just the introduction of international fair use/fair dealing 
principles. 
In light of these special needs, Ruth Okediji recently called for the 
revision of the Appendix to the Berne Convention,117 which permits 
 
115. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 23. 
116. See Okediji, Fostering Access to Education, supra note 81, at 5 (noting that most 
less developed countries need “bulk access to copyrighted works to meet [their] educational 
needs”). 
117. See id.  As Professor Okediji described: 
 The Appendix requires countries [that] intend to avail themselves of the 
Appendix to self-identify by notifying WIPO.  Under Article II, a developing 
country must wait three years after first publication before it can exercise the 
compulsory license for translations.  Even then, the compulsory license cannot be 
issued if the original right owner has exercised the translation right in the language 
at issue.  During the three year ban, the only means of bulk access would be 
negotiations with the copyright owner.  For most scientific works, waiting three 
years means that there is a risk of the information becoming less relevant.  Another 
noteworthy problem with the Appendix is that after a citizen in a developing 
country has filed for a license, there is a six-month grace period during which the 
copyright owner can exercise the translation right.  Only if the owner does not do so 
in this period will the compulsory license proceed to issue.  Finally, it is important to 
note that Article II licenses apply only to teaching, scholarship and research. 
 Article III licenses are the second major component of the Appendix.  An 
Article III license can only be obtained to reproduce and publish for use in 
connection with systematic instructional activities.  These licenses may be issued 
after a five-year period from the date of first publication.  For scientific works, the 
waiting period is three years.  For works of fiction, poetry, drama, music and art, the 
waiting period is seven years. 
 There are other features of the Appendix, but a few notable ones include the 
fact that the Appendix bans parallel imports and requires compensation on specified 
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unauthorized, compensated uses of copyrighted works, but is largely 
unused by less developed countries.118  As she noted, “At the very least, 
the time barriers and other features that have rendered the Appendix a 
failure must be positively addressed.  Otherwise, the Appendix simply 
remains a dull sword for advancing development interests.”119  She also 
called for “more specific adaptation of the Appendix to the digital 
environment”120 and the development of “countervailing principles that 
preclude countries from negotiating around access rules.”121  Deborah 
Hurley, the former director of the Harvard Information Infrastructure 
Project, called for the abolition of copyright ownership in government 
works, or the so-called crown copyrights.122  To her, the removal of 
crown copyrights is “[t]he step that would make the biggest sea change 
tomorrow in intellectual property protection and access to 
information.”123  Uma Suthersanen articulated the need to forge an 
 
terms. 
Id. at 10. 
118. See id. at 9 (describing the Berne Appendix as “a dismal failure”).  As Professor 
Okediji explained, 
[t]he complex conditions imposed on countries that may be interested in using the 
Appendix, coupled with a lack of understanding of the Appendix, has stymied any 
significant examination of the viability of the Appendix to address the chronic 
undersupply of educational materials in developing countries.  Following the TRIPS 
Agreement, developing countries interested in utilizing the Appendix were required 
to notify the WTO of their intention.  Very few countries filed a declaration to this 
effect.  It is unclear whether this will have any material effect on the right of 
developing countries to use the Appendix notwithstanding this omission. 
Id. at 9–10. 
119. Id. at 10. 
120. Id. at 11. 
121. Id. at 12. 
122. See DEBORAH HURLEY, POLE STAR:  HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 36–37 (2003), available at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/ 
globalization/wsis/polestar.pdf; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (stipulating that “[c]opyright 
protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government”).  
As she explained: 
There would be two immediate benefits.  First, large quantities of information 
would become freely available, increasing access to information.  Governments, by 
and large, produce political, social services, economic, and research information, in 
other words, the types of information that people need for carrying out their lives, 
helping others, and bettering their own situations.  Secondly, governments, by 
placing their large thumbs firmly on the side of the scale tipped toward more access 
to information, would reframe the debate and send a strong signal to other content 
providers. 
HURLEY, supra, at 36–37. 
123. HURLEY, supra note 122, at 36. 
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international public interest rule.124  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and 
Jerome Reichman advocated the application of the misuse doctrine and 
competition law at the international level to curb the abuse of market 
power.125 
In addition, many commentators have articulated the needs for 
explicit exemptions, compulsory licensing, and facilitation of cheap 
parallel imports to advance development goals.126  Such an arrangement 
is not limited only to the education context.  Commentators, for 
example, have discussed at length the need for such accommodation in 
the public health arena.127  In the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs 
Agreement and Public Health, less developed countries have requested 
language that protects their needs to have access to affordable drugs in 
light of the public health crises they experience.128  The Declaration 
clarified article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement by recognizing in each 
WTO Member “the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom 
to determine the grounds on which such licenses are granted.”129  The 
Declaration also stated explicitly that “[e]ach Member has the right to 
 
124. See Uma Suthersanen, The Future of Copyright Reform in Developing Countries: 
Teleological Interpretation, Localized Globalism and the “Public Interest” Rule 24 (Int’l Ctr. 
for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Oct. 24–28, 2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ 
bellagio/Bellagio2005/Suthersanen_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
125. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture:  
International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business:  A “Trade Law 
Approach” for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
545, 563 (1996) (“Not only developing countries with underdeveloped national competition 
and intellectual property rights laws, but also developed countries will need more systematic 
rules on the protection of competition among trade-related intellectual property rights and on 
the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse.”); Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair 
Followers, supra note 65, at 52–58 (proposing to use “competition law to curb the abuse of 
market power” as a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPs Agreement in less 
developed countries). 
126. See, e.g., Okediji, Fostering Access to Education, supra note 81, at 11–12. 
127. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing 
Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2001); Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and Access to 
Drugs:  Toward a Solution for Developing Countries Without Manufacturing Capacity?, 17 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 389 (2003); Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS 
Agreement, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307 (2004); Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and 
Hyde Story of International Trade:  The Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS 
Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777 (2004); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, 
Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002); Ellen ‘t Hoen, 
TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines:  A Long Way from Seattle 
to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27 (2002). 
128. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). 
129. Id. ¶ 5(b). 
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determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, 
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.”130 
In addition, the Declaration “recognize[d] that WTO Members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing 
under the TRIPS Agreement.”131  To implement the Declaration, the 
Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health “create[d] a 
means for the grant of licenses from any third country to developing 
countries that lack the capacity and know-how to produce high-quality 
pharmaceuticals, as they lack the market size to justify the 
investment.”132  In the recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong, this decision was made permanent when the WTO member states 
agreed to amend the TRIPs Agreement.133 
E.  Explore the Use of Alternative International Regimes 
Commentators have recently discussed the regime- or forum-shifting 
phenomenon, in which countries move their treaty negotiations from 
one international forum to another in an effort to maximize payoffs.134  
Although developed countries have more political leverage and are 
more likely to engage in a regime shift,135 less developed countries have 
 
130. Id. ¶ 5(c). 
131. Id. ¶ 6. 
132. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 481; see also General Council, Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 
(Sept. 2, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004).  This decision will not terminate until “the date on which 
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that 
Member.”  Id. ¶ 11. 
133. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement And Public 
Health:  Proposal for a Decision on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_decision_e.doc. 
134. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 564–71 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement 
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting]; Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?, supra note 52; 
Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 408–16. 
135. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 134, at 565 (maintaining that “[f]orum-
shifting is a strategy that only the powerful and well-resourced can use”).  A good example of 
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increasingly used regime shifting to enhance their negotiating positions 
and to demand what they otherwise would not be able to get in a forum, 
especially one in which their interests are ignored or marginalized. 
Although less developed countries still have little ability to increase 
bargaining power by shifting regimes, they have successfully used 
regime shifting to develop the political groundwork needed for stronger 
counterbalancing language in international treaties.136  The Doha 
Declaration is a good example.  Had it not been for increasing action by 
less developed countries in these other regimes, these countries might 
not have been successful in pushing for favorable language in the 
Declaration.137  Moreover, the international intellectual property regime, 
to some extent, is handicapped by its lack of maximum standards.138  By 
exploring language used in other regimes, such as the biodiversity 
regime or the human rights regime, less developed countries, therefore, 
might be able to develop counterregime norms that set up maximum 
standards of intellectual property protection.139 
 
regime shifts initiated by developed countries is the shift from WIPO to GATT/WTO in the 
1980s to negotiate heightened standards of intellectual property protection. 
136. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 134, at 59 (noting that regime shifting 
“function[s] as an intermediate strategy that allows developing countries to generate the 
political groundwork necessary for new rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the 
WTO and WIPO”). 
137. By laying down the principles, this language could be very important.  As 
Professors John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos explained: 
The globalization of regulation is played out as a contest of principles.  Agreements 
would rarely be made if they started as enforceable bodies of rules.  Any precision 
in the rules would immediately create a veto coalition disadvantaged by that way of 
framing the rules.  The uncertainty implicit in principles concerning a problem (that 
everyone agrees is a problem) allows everyone to sign on.  All hope the regime will 
not become more specific over time in a way that will hurt their future interests.  But 
since they may not be sure of what those future interests will be (e.g. whether they 
will more frequently end up as complainants or defendants under the rules), they 
sign.  Indeed, a virtue of a thicker veil of uncertainty is that it “increases incentives 
to formulate provisions that are fair or equitable.”  Sometimes this causes parties to 
intentionally thicken the veil of uncertainty initially (e.g. by lengthening the time or 
the range of issues to which a regime will apply) to ensure that all parties can lock in 
to mutually acceptable and just foundational principles for a new regime. 
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 134, at 619 (citations omitted). 
138. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27 (noting that “the WTO system must begin 
to recognize substantive maxima on the scope of available protection”); Laurence R. Helfer, 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property:  Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 47, 58 (2003) (noting the need to articulate “maximum standards” of intellectual 
property protection because “[t]reaties from Berne to Paris to TRIPS are all concerned with 
articulating ‘minimum standards’”); Okediji, International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 87, at 
168 (proposing to develop an international fair use doctrine as a “ceiling”). 
139. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 134, at 14 (discussing how regime shifting 
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F.  Facilitate Coalition Building 
The strategy behind the recent proliferation of free trade 
agreements and bilateral and plurilateral negotiations is divide-and-
conquer.  Since the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancún, the United States has initiated a divide-and-conquer, or 
“coalition busting,”140 policy that seeks to reward those willing to work 
with the country while undermining the efforts by Brazil, India, and 
other members of the Group of 21 to establish a united negotiating front 
for less developed countries.  As United States Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick wrote in the Financial Times shortly after the 
conference, the United States will separate the can-do countries from 
the won’t-do and “will move towards free trade with [only] can-do 
countries.”141 
This strategy was not new.  Indeed, it has been used by the United 
States to increase its leverage vis-à-vis less developed countries during 
the TRIPs negotiations.  In the 1980s, the United States successfully 
used section 301 sanctions to isolate such opposition countries as 
Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand.142  
As Jayashree Watal noted in the case of South Korea, which was 
threatened with sanctions for inadequate protection for computer 
programs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals and in the copyright, patent, 
trademark areas: 
[A]n important subsidiary objective . . . was to separate Korea 
from joining developing country opposition to the GATT 
initiative on IPRs.  Korea was a soft target not only because of its 
dependence on exports and more particularly on the US, but 
because it had already reached a certain level of development 
and could make the transition to strengthened IPR protection 
more easily.143 
To counterbalance this divide-and-conquer strategy, less developed 
countries need to initiate a combine-and-conquer strategy—or, simply 
 
provides an opportunity to generate “counterregime norms”). 
140. ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, UNDP REGIONAL 
CENTER IN COLOMBO, THE GREAT MAZE—REGIONAL AND BILATERAL FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS IN ASIA:  TRENDS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 50 (2005), available at http://www.undprcc.lk/web_trade/publications/Policy 
%20Paper%20Book%203.pdf. 
141. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-Do Countries, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23. 
142. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 413. 
143. WATAL, supra note 3, at 18 (footnote omitted). 
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put, to build more coalitions.  A case in point is what the Group of 21 
did in the Cancún Ministerial:  They successfully prevented the WTO 
member states from reaching agreement on such issues as investment, 
competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.144  
Notwithstanding the success of this coalition, less developed countries 
need to remain vigilant, because such success might be short-lived due 
to the widely divergent interests among the group members.  As 
Sungjoon Cho explained: 
One could not confidently predict that [the collective stance 
taken by the Group of 21] will remain as solid in the future as it 
was in Cancún.  Interests of G-21 members are not homogenous.  
For instance, while India still wants to protect domestic 
agricultural industries, Brazil, a member of the Cairns Group 
consisting of agricultural product exporters, wants to further 
liberalize trade in this area.  Moreover, we witnessed other 
groups of developing countries, such as the G-33, which 
advocated the inclusion of strategic products and a special 
safeguard mechanism in the agriculture negotiation; the coalition 
of the African Union, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
countries, and the LDCs (AU/ACP/LDCs) which collectively 
want the preservation of current preferential treatment in 
addition to G-33 demands.145 
Moreover, less developed countries have had limited success in using 
coalition building to increase their bargaining leverage, partly due to the 
fact that they are “highly dependent on the developed countries as the 
source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World 
Bank, or through investment bankers and securities exchanges.”146  As 
Frederick Abbott observed: 
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to 
achieve solidarity or common positions among developing 
countries in international forums.  At the broad multilateral level 
there was (and are) the Group of 77, and the movement for a 
New International Economic Order.  At the regional level, the 
Andean Pact in the early 1970s developed a rather sophisticated 
common plan to address technology and IP issues (ie Decisions 
84 and 85).  Yet these efforts were largely unsuccessful in shifting 
 
144. See sources cited supra note 5. 
145. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far:  The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 236 
(2004) (footnotes omitted). 
146. Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in 
TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 41, at 36, 43. 
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the balance of negotiating leverage away from developed 
countries.  In fact, developing country common efforts to reform 
the Paris Convention in the late 1970s and early 1980s are 
routinely cited as the triggering event for movement of 
intellectual property negotiations to the GATT.147 
This combine-and-conquer strategy is also useful in the WTO 
dispute settlement context.  Based on the United States’ past refusal to 
implement successful GATT findings against the United States by 
smaller countries, commentators have rightly questioned whether less 
developed countries will “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to 
ensure that the decision is implemented” even if they win their case.148  
Indeed, as William Davey has suggested, there is a good chance that 
“even massive retaliation by a small country would be unnoticed by a 
larger one.”149  Thus, it is important to combine the efforts of various less 
developed countries to maximize the impact on a violating developed 
country.150 
In addition to building coalitions among themselves, less developed 
countries “need to work consistently with U.S. and European political 
allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic political contexts.”151  As 
Gregory Shaffer noted in the public health context: 
If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large 
pharmaceutical firms in the formation of US and European 
positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt of US 
and European coercion in the negotiation and enforcement of 
pharmaceutical patent rights.  In a world of asymmetric power, 
developing countries enhance the prospects of their success if 
other US and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical 
industry’s pressure on US and European trade authorities to 
aggressively advance industry interests.152 
In her book, Susan Sell recounted how twelve corporate executives 
have successfully pushed for the introduction of the TRIPs Agreement 
despite limited intellectual property expertise at the national and 
international policymaking levels.153  As she boldly declared, “[i]n effect, 
 
147. Id. at 42. 
148. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 90 
(1987). 
149. Id. at 102. 
150. Cf. id. (offering a different proposal “to allow smaller nations ‘excess’ 
retaliation”). 
151. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 479. 
152. Id. at 479–80. 
153. As Professor Sell explained: 
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twelve corporations made public law for the world.”154  While some 
might query whether Professor Sell exaggerated the role of 
multinational corporations in the TRIPs negotiations, one could not 
ignore her important message that the domestic political contexts could 
play an important role in influencing international developments.  
Indeed, as Helen Milner pointed out, international cooperation, to some 
extent, is the continuation of domestic politics by other means.155  “The 
structure of domestic preferences,” she maintains, “holds a key to 
understanding international cooperation.”156 
G.  Explore the Tension Between the European Communities and the 
United States 
Less developed countries need to explore the tension between the 
European Communities and the United States.  Although the United 
States and Members of the European Communities are all developed 
countries, they do not have a convergent position on intellectual 
property protection.  In the copyright context, for example, they harbor 
wide disagreement concerning “the protection of moral rights, fair use, 
the first sale doctrine, the work-made-for-hire arrangement, and 
protection against private copying in the digital environment.”157  There 
is also a wide disagreement in such issues as the protection of 
geographical indications.158  Indeed, the European Communities’ initial 
ambivalent position toward the creation of the TRIPs Agreement might 
not have changed had the United States refused to include geographical 
 
Not all ideas are equally privileged in political life; therefore how one defines 
“interests” is central to understanding which sets of ideas affect policy.  
Furthermore, it is important to identify who is defining them.  By promoting their 
particular vision as a solution to pressing US trade problems, the IP activists 
captured the imagination of policymakers and persuaded them to adopt their private 
interests as US national interests.  Additionally, their initiative in producing 
concrete negotiating proposals significantly strengthened their hand. 
SELL, supra note 11, at 8. 
154. Id. at 96. 
155. See HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION:  
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 246–47 (1997). 
156. Id. at 33; see also id. at 239 (suggesting that the legislature is more likely to adopt a 
proposal that it does not fully understand when it can depend on one or more informed 
domestic groups to signal it about the proposal). 
157. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 13, at 625–26 (citations 
omitted). 
158. For a discussion of the protection of geographical indications, see generally Paul J. 
Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications:  Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635 (1996). 
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indications in the proposed GATT.159 
Thus, it is very important to develop a list of differences between the 
European Communities and the United States.  It is also important to 
develop a list of exceptions commonly found in intellectual property 
laws in the United States and Members of the European Communities.  
Both lists will be helpful in preparing policymakers to understand the 
divergent positions taken by the European Communities and the United 
States and will enable them to have more desirable negotiation 
outcomes.  An understanding of the tension between the European 
Communities and the United States will also prevent them from 
committing to conflicting obligations under the free trade agreements.160  
It is bad enough to be forced to sign a bilateral agreement that does not 
meet local conditions.  It is even worse to be put in a position in which 
they have to juggle two conflicting agreements that do not meet local 
conditions and that they cannot honor. 
Sadly, negotiators from the European Communities and the United 
States are likely to be more concerned about the intellectual property 
standards they demand than those they dislike.  For example, the 
United States is likely to be more concerned about the lack of 
protection against circumvention of copy-protection technologies than 
the fact that the target country offers strong protection to geographical 
indications.  Likewise, the European Communities will be more 
concerned about the target country’s refusal to offer strong moral rights 
protection than its adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy161 or the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
of the United States.162 
If less developed countries do not understand the tension between 
the European Communities and the United States, they ultimately 
might adopt the stronger protection of both trading blocs.  In other 
words, their protection might be stronger than what is offered in the 
developed world.  Indeed, commentators have noted that the recent 
 
159. See WATAL, supra note 3, at 23 (noting that the European Communities began to 
root for a GATT treaty “perhaps after a decision among developed countries to include the 
subject of geographical indications”). 
160. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 398–99. 
161. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999), available at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.  The UDRP sets forth the terms and conditions 
related to a dispute between the registrant and a third party over the registration and use of a 
domain name. 
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
provides civil remedies to victims of cybersquatting. 
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protection required by the free trade agreements signed by the United 
States is sometimes higher than what is offered in the United States.  As 
Carlos Correa has noted, “[b]y creating through bilateral negotiations 
standards of protection higher than those applied domestically, the 
powerful U.S. [industries] may be able to force an amendment of U.S. 
domestic law in ways simpler and less costly that [sic] through lobbying 
in Congress.”163 
H.  Assess the Compatibility Between the Free Trade Agreements and the 
Multilateral Trading System 
In recent years, the United States has signed free trade agreements 
with a number of less developed countries, including Chile, Singapore, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Peru, and Oman.164  
Although these agreements include primarily “TRIPs-plus” provisions, 
it remains unclear whether the agreements will be fully compatible with 
the multilateral trading system. 
Consider, for example, the mandatory dispute settlement process, 
which is one of the crowning achievements of the Uruguay Round.  As 
the bargain and self-interest narratives have shown, many countries 
signed on to the TRIPs Agreement because they wanted to be protected 
from the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other 
developed countries.  This major bargain, however, has been 
significantly undercut by the choice-of-forum provisions of the recent 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements, which allow treaty parties 
to file a complaint in a forum other than the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body.165 
To be certain, the United States will still have to defend a WTO 
complaint using the mandatory dispute settlement process, unless it can 
persuade, or compel, other member states to file the complaint in the 
alternative forum.  Nevertheless, when the United States serves as the 
complainant, it will have a choice of forums, and may be able to use the 
 
163. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note 52, at 93. 
164. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States and Oman Sign Free 
Trade Agreement (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ 
Press_Releases/2006/January/asset_upload_file25_8774.pdf. 
165. For a discussion of the choice-of-forum provisions in the bilateral and regional 
free trade agreements initiated by the United States, see generally Peter Drahos, The 
Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/ 
DisputeResolution/TheBilateralWebOfTradeDisputeSettlementPeterDrahos.doc (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2006). 
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alternative forum in the shadow of the WTO dispute settlement process.  
Even more problematic for less developed countries, the bilateral forum 
may not offer similar pro-development safeguards that have been 
recognized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  There is also a 
strong likelihood that the treaty provisions will be interpreted based on 
the U.S. legal tradition, even if such a tradition may not sit well with the 
less developed country party. 
Moreover, due to the bilateral nature of the alternative dispute 
settlement process, the outcome of the process will be limited to the 
parties involved.  Such a process, therefore, may threaten to undermine 
the international trading system.  As Professor Drahos observed: 
[T]hese choice-of-forum provisions to be found in US bilaterals 
do not sit very comfortably with the goal of strengthening the 
multilateral trading system.  WTO members are meant to have 
recourse to the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding] when 
they decide to pursue a remedy for a breach of a WTO 
agreement. . . .  There are good reasons in principle to encourage 
parties to use the DSU.  When parties resolve a trade dispute 
that requires a determination of obligation in one or more of the 
covered agreements of the WTO they deliver a public good for 
other members, assuming that the dispute results in a greater 
certainty of the interpretation of the rules.  Where an infringing 
state brings a measure into conformity with an obligation it has 
under a covered agreement it will be of benefit to all other 
members by virtue of the MFN principle.  In short, the third 
party benefits of two states obtaining a ruling to a dispute under 
a multilateralized dispute resolution mechanism may be 
considerable.  The same cannot be said of bilateral dispute 
resolution proceedings.  By their nature they prop up 
preferential trading arrangements that operate outside of scope 
of the MFN principle.166 
Thus, it is important for less developed countries to assess the 
compatibility between the free trade agreements they have signed and 
the multilateral trading system.  It is also essential to evaluate whether 
the agreements will have any adverse impact on the bargains the 
countries have struck during the TRIPs negotiations.  While the free 
trade agreements may not be in violation of the TRIPs Agreement, 
those agreements could, in effect, cut back the gains obtained by less 
developed countries during the negotiation process. 
 
166. Id. at 12–13. 
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CONCLUSION 
The TRIPs Agreement had very complex origins.  To account for 
these origins, commentators have advanced four dominant, and 
sometimes competing, narratives.  Unfortunately, none of these 
narratives fully explains the development of the Agreement.  Rather, 
each provides valuable insight into understanding the context in which 
the Agreement was created.  While it is important to understand how 
the TRIPs Agreement came into existence, it is more important to 
understand why it came about and what countries need to do to 
preserve the goals and intentions behind the TRIPs negotiations.  
Although there has been much discussion about the “one-way ratchet” 
of intellectual property protection recently pushed by developed 
countries, the battle to protect less developed countries against this 
enhanced protection has not been lost.  Whether less developed 
countries will be able to have an intellectual property system that meets 
local needs will depend on whether they can take advantage of the 
TRIPs Agreement and reform the international intellectual property 
system. 
 
